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Abstract: This paper reexamine Tiebout’s hypothesis of endogenous sorting in a competi-
tive spatial equilibrium setup with both income and preference heterogeneity. Agents decide
endogenously the number of trips to consume a travel-for congestable local public good. We
show that the equilibrium conﬁguration may be completely segregated, incompletely segre-
gated or completely integrated, depending crucially on the scale of local public good services,
relative market rents and the underlying income/preference/local tax parameters. Segre-
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In the postwar period, residential polarization as a result of racial and/or economic segre-
gation has received much attention in both economics and sociology profession. Based on a
widely used dissimilarity index, most of the 30 largest Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs)
in the U.S. have been highly stratiﬁed, especially since 1980 (see Table 1 for the year of 2000).1
Jargowsky (1996) uses the Census tract data over the period from 1970 to 1990 to show the
nation-wide, sharp increase in economic segregation in the 1980s accompanied by a small
decline in racial segregation.
Accordingly, the main focus of this paper is on how the underlying non-racial economic
forces may lead to various equilibrium conﬁgurations. In particular, we allow for both income
and preference heterogeneities and study the possibility that endogenous sorting may be based
on preferences for the local public goods. Moreover, we take into account of spatial factors
explicitly by permitting individuals to determine the number of trips to the site of public
facility. With these considerations, we establish conditions under which a segregated or an
integrated equilibrium may arise in competitive spatial equilibrium.
Stratiﬁcation has been argued to create signiﬁcant disparities in socioeconomic status
(SES), particularly in earned income, education, housing and social norms (cf. Weiss 1989;
Jencks and Meyer 1990). While Wilson (1987) hypothesizes that the on-going increase in
economic segregation plays a crucial role in the formation of urban ghettos, Ihlanfeldt (1994)
suggests that the rapid suburbanization of jobs and workers and the formation of suburban
business district (SBD) have expedited both economic and racial segregation. As a result, the
ratio of central city income per capita to suburban income per capita in the 85 largest MSAs
has dropped from 105% in 1960 to 84% in 1989 (cf. Barnes and Ledebur 1998). The associated
1The dissimilarity index, ﬁrst constructed by Duncan and Duncan (1955), measures the degree to which two
particular population characteristics of interest (such as white versus black or rich versus poor) are distributed
diﬀerently within a population (such as residents in an MSA). For example, using the 2000 Census, DC-
Baltimore had a shocking high dissimilarity index of 0.78, Detroit, 0.70, 8 MSAs in the 0.6 range (including
New York and Chicago), 6 in the 0.5 range (including Boston and Los Angeles), 11 in the 0.4 range (including
Miami and San Francisco), and only 3 below 0.4 (Dallas, Seattle and Portland).
1neighborhood eﬀect (cf. Bond and Coulson 1989) and urban labor-market networking eﬀect
(cf. O’Regan and Quigley 1993), in addition to changes in the commuting technologies (cf.
Sassen 1991), further lead to spatial mismatch with high unemployment rates in central cities
accompanied by high job vacancies in suburbs (see a discussion in Coulson, Laing and Wang
2001 and papers cited therein). Urban unemployment and immobility across generations have
generated the unfortunate pathologies of central cities. Among many others, serious crimes
per capita in central cities have far exceeded the comparable ﬁgures in suburbs (cf. Glaeser,
Sacerdote, and Scheinkman 1996).2
What are the possible underlying forces of economic segregation? In addition to racial
concerns, one may argue there are at least three important economic forces: human/non-
human wealth, accessibility to capital markets, and individual preferences. For instance,
Benabou (1996a) studies the eﬀect of wealth and human capital investment on spatial segre-
gation and economic growth, whereas Benabou (1996b) considers the roles of capital market
imperfections and local spillover played in economic stratiﬁcation. Much of the recent the-
oretical literature follows this vein of research. In a recent empirical investigation, however,
Bayer, McMillan and Rueben (2002) document that heterogeneous preferences for housing
and neighborhood characteristics are essential for endogenous stratiﬁcation in urban housing
markets where social interactions are present. It remains unexplored whether the local public
good (LPG) or ﬁscal competition argument can be regarded as one of the major sources of
the observed outcome of economic segregation, and whether the LPG preference and the con-
ventional income/wealth factors reinforce each other, expediting the process of stratiﬁcation.
The primary purpose of our paper is to address these open issues. Specially, we exam-
ine endogenous sorting by heterogeneous incomes as well as heterogeneous preferences for
a consumable travel-for local public good in competitive spatial equilibrium.3 We highlight
in particular the nature of the travel-for local public good: agents decide endogenously the
2For example, Atlantic City reported 0.34 serious crimes per capita, while Ridgewood village only reported
al o wﬁgure of 0.008.
3Fujita (1986) deﬁnes a traveled-for public good as a special type of Starrett’s (1991) congestable local
public good that is available to consumers only in speciﬁc locations to which they must travel to enjoy the
service. The same concept can also be found in Thisse and Wildasin (1992).
2number of trips to consume its service (patronization), bearing the commuting costs, where
the quality of service is reduced by the degree of congestion measured by the total number of
users. That is, we develop a multi-class competitive spatial equilibrium model of “sorting by
foot” which determines endogenously the pattern of economic stratiﬁcation. The idea that
provision of local public good may induce “voting by foot” can be traced back to Tiebout
(1956) and some important follow-up studies by Arnott and Stiglitz (1979), Ellickson (1979),
Rose-Ackerman (1979) and Bewley (1981).4 This insight, however, has not been applied to
the studdings of economic segregation. Our paper can thus be regarded as a ﬁr s ta t t e m p ta t
ﬁlling this gap, complementing the conventional analysis of economic segregation mentioned
above.
For any set of income, preference and local tax parameters as well as a given site of
local public facility, we establish the range of relative market land rents within which agents
may choose to be segregated or mixed in competitive spatial equilibrium. Extending the
techniques developed in the multi-class locational equilibrium framework by Hartwick et al.
(1976), we use the Negishi (1960) approach to show that a multi-class competitive spatial
equilibrium exists. The equilibrium conﬁguration may be completely segregated, incompletely
segregated or completely integrated, depending crucially on the equilibrium scale of local pub-
lic good services, the relative market rents and the three underlying parameters (preference
heterogeneity, income heterogeneity and local tax progressiveness). Moreover, we ﬁnd that
segregated equilibrium may feature endogenous sorting purely by income or by both income
and preference towards LPG consumption. Furthermore, multiple equilibria may arise when
the equilibrium conﬁguration is incompletely segregated, as either the rich or the poor may
reside closer to the public facility site.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we delineate a two-
community economy with two types of agents who diﬀer in both income and preferences
4See a comprehansive survey by Wildasin (1987) of the early research in this area. Recently, there has
been a growing literature to formalize this Tiebout hypothesis in various dimensions. To name but a few, this
includes Konish at al. (1997), using noncooperative equilibrium concepts, as well as Oates and Schwab (1991),
Scotchmer (1994), Konish (1996), Nechyba (1997) and Conley and Wooders (2001), under the conventional
competitive equilibrium or core setup.
3for the LPG, where the LPG is ﬁnanced by a local tax. Section 3 solves the individual
optimization problem with respect to composite good consumption, the number of trips to
patronize the local public facility, and the choice of residential location. We then establish in
Section 4 the possibility of completely and incompletely segregated equilibrium under which
there are four diﬀerent equilibrium conﬁgurations depending on the relative distance to the
site of the LPG facing the rich relative to the poor and their relative masses. The case of
integrated equilibrium is examined in Section 5. Finally, Section 6 provides a summary of
the main ﬁndings and potential avenues for future research.
2 The Model
We consider a simple model with two types of agents (i = H,L) of a total mass N>0 and
two communities (j =1 ,2). Type-H agents (of mass H) have higher income and higher
preference towards public good consumption than type-L agents (of mass L), where H +L =
N.D e n o t i n g a t y p e - i agent’s income as Y i and letting her preference towards public good
consumption be captured by γi,w eh a v e :Y H >YL > 0 and γH >γ L > 0. Throughout the
paper, we will refer the type-H agents as “the rich” and the type-L agents as “the poor.” For
convenience, it suﬃces to normalize the total population in each community to be identical
(N/2). Denote the (endogenously determined) population of type-i agents in community j as
ij (i = H,L; j =1 ,2). In the absence of vacant land, population balance conditions require
(j =1 ,2):
Hj + Lj = N/2. (1)
The population identities can be conveniently summarized by:
Population 1 2 Total
Type-H H1 H2 H
Type-L L1 L2 L
Total N/2 N/2 N
4A consumable local public good of size K is provided at community 1, where its service
G depends on the degree of congestion from patronization by users measured M. Such a
consumable local public good may include a community park, library, museum, theater hall,
public swimming pool, exercise ﬁeld or other recreational facility. Speciﬁcally, the service of




where α ∈ [0,1] reﬂects the degree of congestion — the local public facility is a nonexclusive
pure public good if α =0and a completely exclusive private good if α =1 .L e t xj ≡
Hj
Nj
denote the fraction of the rich in community j and ni
j measure the number of trips for a





j xj + nL
j (1 − xj)
¤
Nj = M.( 3 )
Denote the composite good consumption as C. Agents of each type are assumed to have
an identical preference of the following form: U = C + γi · nβ · logG,w h e r eβ ∈ (0,1).T h i s
utility functional form extends the separable function proposed by Bergstrom and Cornes
(1983) and Berliant, Peng and Wang (2002) by considering endogenous trips to patronize the
local public facility. More speciﬁcally, an increase in the number of trips is assumed to lead to
more enjoyment but at a diminishing rate. An increase in γi represents a shift in preferences
away from the composite good towards the local public good. In the case where β =0and
γi = γ, our utility speciﬁcation reduces to that in Berliant, Peng and Wang (2002).
Denote Rj as the market rent (on land and housing property) in community j and t(xj)
as the associated property tax rate that depends positively on the fraction of the rich (i.e.,
t0 > 0). Let T measure the unit commuting cost to the site of the local public facility. Since
the local public facility is at community 1, only do community 2 residents bear the commuting
cost. We thus deﬁne an indicator function Ij taking values from {0,1} with I1 =0and I2 =1
and use T ·Ij to measure the commuting cost per trip facing each agent residing in community
j. The local government charges a uniform fee (per user, per trip) at φ>0 for patronizing




5fact that income taxes are progressive, whereas τi
1 >τ i
2 can be thought of as a tax surcharge
imposed at the site of the local public facility.
Therefore, a representative agent of type-i will choose composite good consumption, the
number of trips to patronize the local public facility and the residential location to maximize
the utility subject to the budget constraint. Technically, this optimization problem can be
divided into two steps. In step 1, for a given residential location j, a representative agent of
type-i takes G, Rj, xj and tax/user fee parameters as given to solve:
V i
j =m a x
C,n
C + γinβ logG,( 4 )
s.t. C + Rj(1 + t(xj)) + n(T · Ij + φ)=( 1− τi
j)Y i.( 5 )
In step 2, a representative agent of type-i compares the values (indirect utilities) obtained in
step 1 to choose residential location. That is, she will reside in community h ∈ {1,2} if and
only if V i
h ≥ V i
j for j 6= h and j ∈ {1,2}.
To close the model, we assume that the local public facility is ﬁnanced entirely by revenues










jY i.( 6 )
3 Optimization and Equilibrium
We are now prepared to solve the optimization problem in step 1. Deﬁne the Lagrangian
function L(C,n,λi) as:
L ≡ C + γinβ logG + λi £
(1 − τi






=1− λi =0 ,( 7 )
∂L
∂n
= βγinβ−1 logG − λi(T · Ij + φ)=0 .( 8 )
6Using (2), (3) and (6), we can express the logged level of the local public good service
logG as a function of (ni



























































j;Rj,x j;Y i,γi), (11)
which constitutes a ﬁxed point mapping in ni
























M) captures the positive user fee revenue eﬀect and the negative
congestion eﬀect from an additional trip of a user on the demand for patronizing the local
public facility. Without loss of generality, we impose:
Assumption 1: Γi
j =0 .
This assumption can be justiﬁed by imagining that the underlying local government is
revenue-maximizing with respect to the patronization of its local public facility.
We can then establish:5
Lemma 1: Under Assumption 1, the optimal number of trips to patronizing the local public
facility (ni
j)i si n c r e a s i n gi nt h em a r k e tr e n t s( Rj), the fraction of rich (xj), the level of
income (Y i) and the preference for the local public good (γi).
Proof: All proofs are relegated to the Appendix. ¥
5T h ea s s u m p t i o ni si n n o c u o u sa so u rr e s u l t sa r er o b u s ta sl o n ga st h ed i r e c te ﬀect dominates these two





7Next, substituting (11) into (5), we have:
Ci
j =( 1− τi
j)Y i − Rj(1 + t(xj)) − (β · γi · logG)
− 1




which can be substituted into (4) to yield the indirect utility function:
V i
j (Rj,x j; Ij)=( 1− τi
j)Y i − Rj(1 + t(xj)) + (1 − β)γi(ni
j)β logG. (14)
We can now deﬁne the bid-rent Ψ as the slope of the indiﬀerence curves in (Rj,x j) space:














K − 1], which captures all the eﬀects of γi and Y i on the bid rent. To
ensure positive bid rents, we need: Si
j < 1/t(xj) for all i and j.R e c a l l t h a t ni
j is strictly
increasing in γi and ni
1 >n i
2.W e t h u s h a v e SH
1 =m a x i,j{Si
j}.M o r e o v e r , t(xj) is strictly















We can then obtain:
Lemma 2: Under Assumptions 1 and 2, the bid rents are positive, satisfying:





Utilizing Lemmas 1 and 2, we then establish:


























8Thus, the bid rent is always increasing in individuals’ preferences towards the local public
good. It is increasing in individuals’ incomes only when the scale of local public good services
is small. Intuitively, income generates two opposing eﬀects. On the one hand, there is a
patronization eﬀect: higher income encourages the use of the local public facility (higher ni
j),
thereby raising the bid rent. On the other, it creates a diminishing-return eﬀect:h i g h e r
income leads to a larger tax revenue and a greater provision of the local public good (K),
which, by diminishing marginal utility, results in a lower bid rent. When the scale of local
public good services is small, the diminishing return eﬀect is dominated by the patronization
eﬀect. As a consequence, the bid rent depends positively on income.
At y p ei person will choose location of region h ∈ {1,2} if
V i
h(Ih,R h,t(xh)) > V i
j (Ij,R j,t(xj)) ∀ j 6= h, (18)
where the relevant indirect utilities are given by (14). This may be referred to as the optimal
locational choice condition. Following Negishi (1960), we must ﬁnd equilibrium price support
(market rents) for any equilibrium conﬁguration to be established. We can now deﬁne the
concept of equilibrium with endogenous sorting,
Deﬁnition 1: A multi-class competitive spatial equilibrium (MCSE) is a tuple {ni
j,
Ci
j,I j, Ψj,G ,M,K ,H j,L j} and the market land rents {Rj} such that the following conditions
are satisﬁed:
(i) given the residential location, each individual maximizes her utility subject to her budget
constraint, i.e., (5), (11) and (13) are met;
(ii) the market rents are in appropriate range such that the optimal locational choice con-
ditions (18) are met for all individuals and that each individual only resides in one
location (I1 + I2 =1 );
(iii) the bid rents satisfy (15);
9(iv) the service of the local public good is captured by (2), the number of users patronizing
the local public good is captured by (3), and the government budget is balanced as given
by (6);
(v) the population balance conditions (1) are met for both communities.
In the next two sections, we will characterize the MCSE. There are two types of MCSE:
segregated and integrated. In a segregated equilibrium, at least one of the two communities
must have residents of a homogeneous type. Depending on the relative size of the population
of the rich to the poor, however, a segregated equilibrium may have both types residing in
one of the two communities. When each community only contains one type of residents, the
equilibrium is called completely segregated. Ina ni n t e g r a t e de q u i l i b r i u m ,b o t hc o m m u n i t i e s
must be populated by residents of both types. Formally, these equilibrium conﬁgurations can
be deﬁned as:
Deﬁnition 2: A multi-class competitive spatial equilibrium {ni
j,C i
j,I j, Ψj,G ,M ,K ,H j,
Lj; Rj} is called,
(i) completely segregated if Hj · Lj =0for both j =1and j =2 ;
(ii) incompletely segregated if Hj · Lj =0for either j =1or j =2(but not both);
(iii) integrated if Hj + Lj = N/2 and Hj,L j > 0.
We will establish conditions on the underlying parameters and ranges of market rents un-
der which each type of equilibrium conﬁguration is supported. Obviously, from the population
balance condition, a completely segregated equilibrium is possible only when H = L = N/2.
To simplify the analysis, we assume throughout the remainder of the paper that the property
tax rate is proportional to the fraction of rich, that is,
Assumption 3: t(xj)=t0 · xj,w i t ht0 > 0.
104 Segregated Equilibrium
We begin by examining the case of segregated equilibrium. From the bid rent function (15),
this type of equilibrium requires that the bid rent be increasing in Y i. That is, the willingness
to pay for a higher market land (property) rent must be matched by the ability to pay. By




There are two cases to consider: (i) equal population of the rich and the poor and (ii)
unequal population of the rich and the poor. While the former case may results in complete
segregation, the stratiﬁcation between the rich and the poor in the latter case must be
incomplete. Depending on the parameters, it is possible that the rich reside in community
1 where the local public facility is provided or in community 2 w h e r et h e yn e e dt ot r a v e li n
order to consume the local public good service. If we regard community 1 as city center with
publicly provided museums and activity facilities and community 2 as suburbs, the former
case captures many Asian and European cities (e.g., London, Paris, Rome, Taipei and Tokyo),
whereas the latter is consistent with the conﬁgurations of typical American cities (such as
Atlanta, Chicago, Detroit, Los Angeles and Washington DC).
4.1 Complete Segregation
Consider the case where the rich and the poor are of equal size: H = L = N/2.W ew i l ls h o w
when the market rents are within an appropriate range, the equilibrium feature a complete
segregation in the sense that the rich all reside in one community and the poor in another.
Since the rich may all reside in community 1 or in community 2 depending on the underlying
set of parameters, each case must be analyzed accordingly, to which we now turn.
4.1.1 The Rich are Closer to the Site of Public Facility
The ﬁrst case is that all the rich reside in community 1 and the poor travel for public good
services. Speciﬁcally, we have: x1 =1and x2 =0 . To ensure this is an optimal locational
11choice to every individual, it requires: V H
1 >VH




Population 1 2 Total
Type-H H H
Type-L L L
Total N/2 N/2 N
4.1.2 The Poor are Closer to the Site of Public Facility
The second case is that all the poor reside in community 1 and the rich travel for public good







Population 1 2 Total
Type-H H H
Type-L L L
Total N/2 N/2 N
4.1.3 Completely Segregated Equilibrium
Deﬁne,































R0(G) < ∆τHY H − ∆τLY L.
We can now establish:
Proposition 2: (Completely Segregated MCSE) Under Assumptions 1-3 and Condition S,
a multi-class competitive spatial equilibrium with complete segregation exists.
12(a) If we impose additionally Assumption 4a, then in this equilibrium the rich are closer to
the site of public facility given,
(γL)
1





1−βR0(G) − ∆τHY H + R2
1+t0
. (20)
(b) If we impose instead Assumption 4b, then in this equilibrium the poor are closer to the
site of public facility given,
(γH)
1
1−βR0(G)−∆τHY H+R2(1+t0) <R 1 < (γL)
1
1−βR0(G)−∆τLY L+R2(1+t0). (21)
Notably, while Assumption 4a ensures the inequalities in (20) to be valid, Assumption 4b
guarantees the validity of (21).Assumptions 4a and 4b are mutually exclusive, thereby ruling
out the possibility of multiple equilibrium conﬁgurations.
Focusing ﬁrst on part (a) of Proposition 2, it requires that the preference diﬀerential must
be suﬃciently large to overcome the diﬀerences in income and income tax progressiveness.
In this case, endogenous sorting is by both income and preferences towards local public good
consumption. Interestingly, the inequality in Assumption 4a is more likely to hold if the level
of provision of the local public good is high (as R0 is larger), provided that Condition S is still
satisﬁed. Notice that in equilibrium one can only pin down the relative market rent between
the two communities. Should we ﬁx R2 at the agricultural land rent or as an exogenous
multiple of the agricultural land rent, the range of R1 is fully determined by (20).6
Turning next to part (b), the inequality in Assumption 4b is met if the preference dif-
ferential is small and the level of local public good provision is low. When this inequality
holds, endogenous sorting to a completely segregated equilibrium is entirely driven by income
heterogeneity, as those with stronger preferences towards the local public good (the type-H)
are now residing away from the site of public facility.
6In a close city model with a ﬁnite number of communities, the land rent at the boundary need not equal
the agricultural land rent.
134.2 Incomplete Segregation
W h e nt h er i c ha n dt h ep o o rh a v ed i ﬀerent population masses, one of the two communities
must have mixed residents of both types. There are two cases to be studied: (i) more rich
than poor (H>L ,o r ,H
N > 1
2) and (ii) more poor than rich (H
N < 1
2). In the ﬁrst case,
community 2 is mixed with both types, whereas in the second, community 1 is mixed.
4.2.1 More Rich Than Poor
Since the population of the rich exceeds that of the poor, some of the rich must reside with
the poor by construction. Depending on the underlying parameters, the poor may reside in
community 1 or community 2.




N − 1. With some of the rich residing in community 1 and others in
community 2, locational equilibrium requires: V H
1 = V H




Population 1 2 Total
Type-H H1 H2 H
Type-L L L
Total N/2 N/2 N
B. The Poor are Closer to the Site of Public Facility In this case, we have x1 = 2H
N −1
and x2 =1 . Again, locational equilibrium requires: V H
1 = V H




Population 1 2 Total
Type-H H1 H2 H
Type-L L L
Total N/2 N/2 N
14C. Incompletely Segregated Equilibrium with More Rich than Poor Deﬁne,
Λ ≡











As shown in the appendix, we can establish:
Proposition 3: (Incompletely Segregated MCSE) Under Assumptions 1-3 and Condition
S, a multi-class competitive spatial equilibrium with incomplete segregation exists.





















[Λ +( 1+t0)R2]. (23)
(c) The equilibrium is indeterminate in which either the rich or the poor may be closer to
t h es i t eo fp u b l i cf a c i l i t yi ﬀ
1
1+t0





The incompletely segregated equilibrium conﬁguration with the rich closer to the public
facility site is supported by relatively high market rent in the community with the public
facility (community 1), whereas that with the poor closer to the public facility site is supported
by relatively low market rent in community 1. When market rents fall in the range (24),
multiple equilibria arise as the poor may reside either in community 1 or in community 2,
depending on the self-fulﬁlling prophecies.
4.2.2 More Poor Than Rich
Now, the population of the poor exceeds that of the rich, thereby forcing some of the poor
to reside with the rich. Again, depending on the underlying parameters and relative market
rents, the rich may reside in community 1 or community 2.
15A. The Rich are Closer to the Site of Public Facility In this case, we have x1 = 2H
N
and x2 =0 . As some of the poor now reside in community 1 and others in community 2,
locational equilibrium requires: V H
1 >VH
2 and V L
1 = V L
2 .
K
Population 1 2 Total
Type-H H H
Type-L L1 L2 L
Total N/2 N/2 N
B. The Poor are Closer to the Site of Public Facility In this case, we have x1 =0
and x2 = 2H
N ,w h i c hr e q u i r e :V H
1 <VH
2 and V L
1 = V L
2 .
K
Population 1 2 Total
Type-H H H
Type-L L1 L2 L
Total N/2 N/2 N
C. Incompletely Segregated Equilibrium with More Poor than Rich Parallel to
t h ec a s ew i t hm o r er i c ht h a np o o r ,w ec a no b t a i nt h ef o l l o w i n g :
Proposition 4: (Incompletely Segregated MCSE) Under Assumptions 1-3 and Condition
S, a multi-class competitive spatial equilibrium with incomplete segregation exists.






(Λ + R2). (25)
(b) In this equilibrium, the poor are closer to the site of public facility iﬀ




16(c) The equilibrium is indeterminate in which either the rich or the poor may be closer to
t h es i t eo fp u b l i cf a c i l i t yi ﬀ
1
1+t0(2H/N)
(Λ + R2) <R 1 < Λ + R2[1 + t0(2H/N)]. (27)
Since the intuition behind Proposition 4 resembles that underlying Proposition 3, it is
omitted for the sake of simplicity. Again, when the market rents fall in the range of (27), the
economy features multiple equilibria in which the rich may reside in community 1 or 2.
5 Integrated Equilibrium
We now study the case of integrated equilibrium under which both communities must be
populated by residents of both types.
K
Population 1 2 Total
Type-H H1 H2 H
Type-L L1 L2 L
Total N/2 N/2 N
From the bid rent functions (15), this type of equilibrium requires that the bid rents be
decreasing in income, or, using (17), the following condition must be met: logG>
β
1−β.T h a t
is, the service of the local public good is suﬃciently large so that the diminishing-return eﬀect
dominates the patronization eﬀect. In an integrated equilibrium, it requires: V i












which is positive because γH >γ L,YH >YL and ∆τH > ∆τL. In order to satisfy logG>
β















We will show below that for each pair of market rents within a speciﬁcr a n g e ,t h e r ei sa
corresponding value of x1 (and x2 = 2H
N − x1) which falls within the unit interval, (0,1).
Proposition 5: (Integrated MCSE) Under Assumptions 1-3 and Condition I, a multi-class


































Condition I indicates that in order for an integrated equilibrium to exist, we need the
preference heterogeneity not too large (other things being equal). Notice that when R1 =
R2 + Λ
1+t0H/N,w eh a v e :x1 = x2 = H
N. This features a symmetric integrated equilibrium
where both communities have an identical fraction of rich. In general, the proportion of rich
need not be equalized across the two communities, depending crucially on the relative market
rent.
6C o n c l u s i o n s
We have characterized competitive spatial equilibrium with endogenous sorting where the
equilibrium conﬁguration may be completely segregated, incompletely segregated or com-
pletely integrated, depending on the relative market rents and the underlying parameters
(especially, preference heterogeneity, income heterogeneity and local tax progressiveness).
We have established equilibrium featuring endogenous sorting by both income and preference
towards local public good consumption or by income only. Multiple equilibria may arise when
the equilibrium conﬁguration is incompletely segregated.
18The main results established in our paper can be best summarized as follows (see also
Table 2 for a brief outline of the ﬁndings concerning segregated equilibrium outcomes).
(i) Under Condition S (logG<
β
1−β):
1. H = L








1−βR0(G) − ∆τLY L + R2]/(1 + t0) <
R1 < [(γH)
1
1−βR0(G)−∆τHY H +R2]/(1+t0): complete segregation with the rich
closer to the public facility site (endogenous sorting by both income and preferences
towards local public good consumption),








1−βR0(G) − ∆τHY H + R2(1 + t0) <
R1 < (γL)
1
1−βR0(G) − ∆τLY L + R2(1 + t0): complete segregation with the poor
closer to the public facility site (endogenous sorting purely by income).
2. H>L
(a) under R1 >
Λ+(1+t0)R2
1+t0(2H/N−1): incomplete segregation with the rich closer to the public




1+t0 <R 1 <
Λ+(1+t0)R2
1+t0(2H/N−1): incomplete segregation with ei-
ther the rich or the poor closer to the public facility site (multiple equilibria),
(c) under R1 <
Λ+[1+t0(2H/N−1)]R2
1+t0 : incomplete segregation with the poor closer to
the public facility site (endogenous sorting purely by income).
3. H<L
(a) under R1 > Λ + R2[1 + t0(2H/N)]: incomplete segregation with the rich closer to
the public facility site (endogenous sorting by both income and preferences towards
local public good consumption),
19(b) under Λ+R2
1+t0(2H/N) <R 1 < Λ + R2[1 + t0(2H/N)]: incomplete segregation with
either the rich or the poor closer to the public facility site (multiple equilibria),
(c) under R1 < Λ+R2
1+t0(2H/N): incomplete segregation with the poor closer to the public
facility site (endogenous sorting purely by income).
(ii) Under Condition I (logG>
β
1−β): integration (no income or preference sorting).
There are at least three possible avenues for future research. First, we may abandon
the assumption of positive correlation between income and preferences for the local public
good, i.e., agents may be divided into four categories: high income and high preferences
for the local public good, low income and high preferences for the local public good, high
income and low preferences for the local public good, and low income and low preferences
for the local public good. One may ask whether pure stratiﬁcation by preferences towards
local public good consumption can now occur. Second, it may be interesting to consider
an alternative equilibrium concept based on the club theory (especially the “clubs and the
market” framework developed by Ellickson, Grodal, Scotchmer, and Zame 1999 and 2002).
In particular, we can view diﬀerent stratiﬁed classes as clubs and establish the formation of
these clubs. Third, one may introduce the political economy issues, establishing voting or
other mechanisms to determine endogenously the level of local public good provision or the
setting of the ﬁscal instruments (user fee as well as local income and property tax rates).
Of course, one must bear in mind the such a political equilibrium need not exist in general.
Finally, our paper conducts exclusively a positive analysis concerning equilibrium sorting by
income and preferences for the travel-for consumable local public good. It may be interesting
to undertake a normative analysis, examining, on the basis of eﬃciency and equity, which
policy may achieve higher welfare for the local economy as a whole.
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∂Y idY i +
∂q
∂γidγi,
where under Assumption 1, Γi




=0 . Using (6), it is trivial that ∂K
∂M = φ,
∂K
∂Rj = t(xj) and ∂K
















































































γi > 0, (A8)
which complete the proof. ¥




























− 1].( A 9 )




= −(1 + t(xj)) + γi(1 − β)(ni
j)β. (A10)
Combining (A9) and (A10) gives,






and hence the result in (15). ¥




























− logG] R 0,
thus giving the properties in the proposition. ¥
Proof of Proposition 2: We ﬁrst consider part (a). From (14), the indirect utility diﬀer-
ential for a type-i agent between the two communities is:
V i
1 − V i












1−β]+[ R2 − R1(1 + t0)] − ∆τiY i,
where ∆τi ≡ τi
1 − τi
2.T h u s ,V H
1 − V H
2 > 0 requires:
(γH)
1
1−βR0(G) − ∆τHY H >R 1(1 + t0) − R2, (A11)
where R0(G) is deﬁn e di n( 1 9 ) .S i m i l a r l y ,V L
1 − V L
2 < 0 requires:
(γL)
1
1−βR0(G) − ∆τLY L <R 1(1 + t0) − R2. (A12)
Combining (A11) and (A12) yields the required condition of Proposition 2(a) under Assump-
tion 4a.
Similarly, for part (b), we utilize (14) and repeat the same steps as before, to establish
that V H
1 − V H
2 < 0 and V L
1 − V L
2 < 0, respectively, require:
(γH)
1
1−βR0(G) − ∆τHY H <R 1 − R2(1 + t0), (A13)
(γL)
1
1−βR0(G) − ∆τLY L >R 1 − R2(1 + t0). (A14)
22Combining (A13) and (A14), we obtain the required condition Proposition 2(b) under As-
sumption 4b. ¥
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3 :Consider part (a). Following similar steps as in the proof of
Proposition 2, we can express V H




1−βR0(G) − ∆τHY H = R1(1 + t0) − R2(1 + t0x2), (A15)
and V L
1 − V L
2 < 0 as:
(γL)
1
1−βR0(G) − ∆τLY L <R 1(1 + t0) − R2(1 + t0x2). (A16)
Substituting 1+t0x2 =1+t0(2H
N − 1) into the above expressions, we can then use (A15) to
eliminate R0(G) in (A16) to obtain the result.
Consider next part (b). By straightforward manipulation, V H




1−βR0(G) − ∆τHY H = R1(1 + t0x1) − R2(1 + t0),
whereas V L
1 − V L
2 > 0 requires:
(γL)
1
1−βR0(G) − ∆τLY L >R 1(1 + t0x1) − R2(1 + t0).
These together yield the required inequalities.
Part (c) is a direct consequence of parts (a) and (b) by comparing the equilibrium ranges
of market rents. ¥




1 = V L
2 require, respectively, as follows:
(γH)
1
1−βR0(G) − ∆τHY H >R 1(1 + t0x1) − R2,
(γL)
1
1−βR0(G) − ∆τLY L = R1(1 + t0x1) − R2.
By eliminating R0(G), we then derive (25).
For part (b), the requirements that V H
1 <VH
2 and V L




1−βR0(G) − ∆τHY H <R 1 − R2(1 + t0x2),
(γL)
1
1−βR0(G) − ∆τLY L = R1 − R2(1 + t0x2).
Repeating the same exercise to eliminate R0(G) gives (26).
Finally, part (c) is shown by comparing the equilibrium ranges of market rents in (25)
and (26). ¥




(1−β)R0(G) − ∆τHY H = R1(1 + t0x1) − R2(1 + t0x2), (A17)
(γL)
1
(1−β)R0(G) − ∆τLY L = R1(1 + t0x1) − R2(1 + t0x2). (A18)
Combining (A17) and (A18) to eliminate market rents, we obtain:
R0(G)=Ω. (A19)
It is easily seen that for any set of income and local tax parameters, Ω is decreasing
in the degree of heterogeneity in preferences towards the local public good. Substituting
x2 = 2H









[Λ − (R1 − R2)]. (A20)
Since x1 ∈ (0,1), we can manipulate (A20) to obtain the following two inequalities:







− 1) + Λ < (1 + t0)R1 − R2.
These can be combined to obtain (28). Finally, from the deﬁnitions of R0(G) and Ω and
(A19), we get (29), which completes the proof. ¥
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